Federal Court makes noteworthy rulings on partitioning of land under the National Land Code

23 February 2026

In Lee Kian Choon v Khoo San & 2 Ors [2026] 1 AMR 493, the Federal Court made several noteworthy rulings in relation to sections 141A, 142(3), 143(4) and 418 of the National Land Code (Revised 2020) (“NLC”) on the partitioning of land.

Brief facts

The first respondent (“R1”) and the father of the appellant (“A”) were co-proprietors of a parcel of land (“original land”), each holding an undivided half share. On 4 November 1971, R1 and A’s father entered into an agreement (“agreement”) in relation to the original land, which among others, included a sketch plan dividing the said land into two parts, one of which was for use by R1 to plant oil palm trees and the other of which was for use by A’s father to plant durian trees. Clause 6 of the agreement provided that the agreement would be binding on the personal representatives, assigns and successors in title of the respective parties.

On 16 June 2008, A’s father transferred his undivided half share of the original land to A, who by clause 6 became bound by the terms of the agreement.

As a result of a land acquisition by the government of part of the original land in 2015, the original land was severed into two separate land titles (collectively “lands”), each of which continued to be held by R and A in undivided half shares.

On 4 February 2020, R1 without the knowledge or consent of A, applied under sections 140 to 144 of the NLC to partition the lands in a manner that differed from the sketch plan attached to the agreement. R1’s application to partition the lands was approved by the 2^nd respondent, the Selangor State Director of Lands and Mines (“R2”) on 7 August 2020 but A was not informed of the same. Consequent on R2’s approval of R1’s partitioning application, four new qualified titles (“new titles”) were issued by the 3^rd respondent, the Klang District Land Administrator (“R3”).

A first learnt of the partition in early March 2021 when a surveyor from the Klang Land Office carried out a land survey on A’s part of the lands and showed him an approval letter dated 3 September 2020.

Subsequently, A through his previous solicitors sent a letter dated 26 March 2021 to R3 objecting to the partitioning of his portion of the land and enquired whether R1’s portion of the land was also partitioned. Upon A being informed that R3 did not receive the letter of 26 March 2021, A’s previous lawyers resent the said letter and a further letter dated 13 August 2021 requesting documents relating to the application for partition of the lands. On 18 August 2021, R3 served copies of the relevant documents and R2’s decision on R1’s application to partition the lands on A’s previous lawyers.

From the documents provided by R3, A found that:

the application form for the partition of the lands was not signed by him;
R1 did not disclose the existence of the agreement to R2; and
the partition was in breach of the terms of the agreement.

A then filed an application in the High Court appealing against R2’s decision to partition the lands. The respondents argued that the court did not have the jurisdiction to hear A’s appeal as it had been filed after the expiry of the three months’ time frame allowed under section 418 of the NLC for an appeal to be filed.

Decision of the High Court

The High Court dismissed A’s application, holding, inter alia, that:

section 418 of the NLC required A to file the appeal against R2’s decision within three months from the date A was notified and came to know of R2’s decision to approve R1’s application to partition A’s portion of the lands;
the Court was of the view that the three months should be calculated from March 2021¹ when A was informed by the land surveyor of R2’s decision to partition the lands and not from 18 August 2021, the date A’s previous lawyers received the documents on the partition from R2 or R3; and
as A’s appeal was filed after the expiry of the three months stipulated in section 418 of the NLC, the Court had no jurisdiction to allow A’s appeal under section 418.

Decision of the Court of Appeal

A’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

Based on the Federal Court’s decision in Mohd Nadir A Syed Ahamed & Lain-Lain lwn Zubaidi Abdul Hamid & Lain-Lain [1994] 2 MLJ 159, the Court of Appeal held that the three month timeline to file the appeal under section 418 of the NLC is to be calculated from the date when A was informed about the decision of partitioning in early March 2021 and not from the date he received the documents about the partition from R2 or R3 in August 2021.

Decision of the Federal Court

The Question of Law

Leave was granted to A to appeal to the Federal Court of the following question of law:

Section 418 NLC 1980 (sic) provides "... within the period of three months beginning with the date on which it was communicated to him ...". Whether the phrase "communicated to him" here requires official letter officially from the Land Office?"

The Answer to the Question of Law

The question was answered by the Federal Court in the following terms:

Section 143(4) of the NLC provides that the decision of R2 or R3, as the case may be, shall be notified by R3 to each of the co-proprietors. The notification shall be served on the co-proprietors in accordance with section 431 of the NLC, which necessarily means that it must be writing and be official documentary communication under the hand of the authority such that it conforms with the requirements of the NLC. Hence, the phrase “communicated to him” in section 418 of the NLC must be via official correspondence from R3.

Relevant statutory provisions

A summary of the relevant provisions of the NLC referred to by the Federal Court is as follows:

Section 141A which provides that where other co-proprietors neither join in nor consent to the making of the application, any co-proprietor may apply for approval to partition the land;
Section 142(3) which provides that where an application is made under section 141A, the Land Administrator shall notify the other co-proprietors of the proposed partition, requiring them to submit in writing within 28 days from the date of service of the notice, any objection setting out fully the grounds on which the objection is based;
Section 142(4) which, inter alia, provides the upon expiry of the 28-days period specified in section 142(3), the Land Administrator:

where there are objections, shall notify the applicant and the remaining co-proprietors and hold an enquiry at the specified time and place, and:

if satisfied that good grounds exist, shall reject the application or, in the case of an application relating to land the partition of which requires the approval of the State Director, shall recommend that the application be rejected; or
in any other case, may approve the application or (as the case may be), recommend to the State Director that the application be approved;

where there are no objections, after due consideration, may approve the application or (as the case may be), recommend to the State Director to approve the application;

Section 143 which, inter alia, requires the Land Administrator to notify all co-proprietors of the State Director’s or the Land Administrator’s, as the case may be, approval of the application for partitioning of the lands, and other matters such as the survey fees and fees chargeable for the issue of documents of title to each portion of the partitioned lands;
Section 431 which, inter alia, sets out the manner in which a notice may be served on a person under the NLC;
Section 418(1) which, inter alia, provides that any person aggrieved by any decision under the NLC may, “at any time within the period of three months beginning with the date on which it was communicated to him, appeal therefrom to the Court” and section 418(3) which states that a “decision” includes “any act, omission, refusal, direction or order”; and
Section 430 which states that a “notice” includes “any notification, instrument or other document authorised or required by this Act to be served on any person or body”.

Reasons for the Federal Court’s decision

The Federal Court pointed out that where an application for partition is made under section 141A of the NLC, which is the case here, section 142(3) of the NLC contains two important provisions - the first is a legal duty and the other a statutory right, namely:

that upon receiving R1’s application under section 141A, R3 shall give notice of R1’s application to A as the other co-proprietor of the lands; and
that upon receipt of such notification, the other co-proprietors are afforded the statutory right to object to the application for partition within 28 days from the date of service of the notice.

Further, section 142(4)(a) of the NLC provides that where there are objections by the other co-proprietors to the proposed partition, R3 shall give notice to all co-proprietors of an enquiry into the objections to be held at a specified time and place. According to the Federal Court, this right of the co-proprietors to be heard is a substantive right in law.

It was common ground that A was neither involved in nor notified of R1’s application for the partition of the lands. As the Court of Appeal had held that R3’s attempt to serve the section 142(3) statutory notice of R1’s application to A by substituted service² was irregular, there was no proper service of the notice required under section 142(3) of the NLC. This failure meant that A was deprived of his right to object to R1’s application and further denied his right to be heard on the objection at the statutorily mandated enquiry to be conducted by R3. The Federal Court held such failure to be a grave breach of A’s statutory right and a clear denial of natural justice.

From its reading of sections 430 and 431 of the NLC, the Federal Court held that it is very clear that in order for a notice to be served in the manner prescribed in section 431 of the NLC, it must be in writing, for the act of serving the notice by delivering, leaving, posting, or substituted service in mode envisaged in section 432 of the NLC can only be done through a document.

According to the Federal Court, “An administrative decision is not operative until proper notice is given to the person affected. Public authorities must act reasonably and fairly, which includes communicating their decisions effectively so that the persons affected can exercise their legal rights. Where the statute required notice to be served, failure to communicate in accordance with the statutory procedure rendered the decision ineffective and unenforceable.”

Arising therefrom, their Lordships said that “for time to run for an appeal to be lodged under s 418 of the NLC, the appellant would need to be properly served with the decision in accordance with the relevant provisions of the statute, from which the appellant would have actual knowledge of the decision.”

The Federal Court acknowledged that the question as to whether a formal mode of communication is required depends on the nature of the decision, the statutory framework governing the authority, and the legal consequences of the decision. Although a particular form of notice is not specified in the NLC, the learned judges emphasised that the decision to be communicated under section 143(4) must be in writing by virtue of the provisions of section 431 of the NLC relating to method of service of notices, and such notice must contain the conditions or particulars stipulated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 143(4).

Where the enabling statute prescribes the mode of communication, those requirements must be strictly followed. Hence, in this case, the decision of R2 must be officially conveyed in writing to those affected, including A as co-proprietor, as is required under section 143(4) of the NLC. Thus, the notice shall be officially under the hand of R3 and shall convey the decision fully and must contain sufficient particulars to enable those affected to avail themselves of their legal rights and remedies, including filing an appeal to the High Court under section 418 of the NLC.

The Court added that the right to be informed of a decision of an authority carrying out a statutory function is not merely part of procedural fairness but one of substantial justice. A person cannot be expected to comply with or challenge a decision they are unaware of or one that does not convey the decision comprehensively as a whole. Thus, when an authority conveys any decision upon a formal application being made, such as an application for partition under section 141A, it is best done via formal written communication for reasons that include the following:

it affects legal rights or obligations and provides clear evidence of the date and content of the decision;
it protects the authority against claims of non-communication and in this regard establishes proof of communication; and
it enables accurate calculation of time limits for statutory appeals or judicial review.

The Federal Court did not accept the information conveyed by the land surveyor to A in early March 2021 as sufficient for the purposes of section 143 for the following reasons:

the surveyor was not on the land to serve the notice of R2’s decision, which must be done in accordance with section 143(4) of the NLC, but merely to carry out land survey works;
as the surveyor also did not mention the approval for partition of the second piece of land of which A was the co-proprietor, the information given by the surveyor was at best, incomplete; and
the manner in which the lands were partitioned was not conveyed to A.

In light of the above, the Court concluded that it cannot be said that A had actual knowledge in March 2021 of R2’s decision to approve the partition of the lands.

It was only on 18 August 2021 when R2 and R3 provided A with copies of R1’s application to partition the lands and the documents evidencing R2’s decision made on 7 August 2020 approving R1’s application for partition that A was served with notice of R1’s application under section 141A as well as notice of R2’s decision approving the partition of the lands, which would accord with the requirements of sections 143(4) and 431 of the NLC.

Hence, the learned appeal judges were of the considered view that for the computation of time under section 418 of the NLC, the date on which the decision was communicated to A was 18 August 2021 and not March 2021. The Court concluded that the High Court and Court of Appeal had erred in holding that the three months' timeline to file the appeal under section 418 of the NLC was to be calculated from the date A was informed about R2’s decision by the surveyor in early March 2021 and not from the date A received actual notice of the decision in full, and the related documents. It was only on 18 August 2021 that A knew with some certainty as to the exact nature of R2’s partition approval, thus enabling him to effectively lodge an appeal under section 418 of the NLC.

As A’s appeal to the High Court was filed on 3 November 2021, it was within the three-months’ time frame prescribed under section 418 of the NLC. Accordingly, the Federal Court held that the appeal is competent and ought to have been considered on its merits by the courts below.

Merits of the appeal

The Federal Court then considered A’s appeal and allowed the same for the following reasons:

A was entitled to rely on and enforce the terms of the agreement;
R1’s conduct in applying for and obtaining partition of the lands in a manner that departs from the sketch plan attached to the agreement was a clear violation of A’s rights under the agreement;
in making the application for partition under section 141A, R1 has a duty to make full and frank disclose of all relevant matters for the consideration of the approving authority, i.e. R2; and
the agreement is a crucial document that must be disclosed in the application for partition, and R1’s failure to do so meant that R2 did not have all relevant information when it made its decision to partition the lands in the manner sought by R1 - this caused injustice and harm to A as the partition resulted in about half of A’s durian trees going to R1 and half of R1’s oil palm trees going to A.

Additionally, the Federal Court found that the non-service on A of R1’s application to partition the lands as required under section 142(3) of the NLC was a fatal flaw that vitiated the proceedings for partition conducted by R2 and rendered his decision invalid, as A had been deprived of his statutory right to object to R1’s application to partition the lands and to be heard on it.

In light of its findings, the Federal Court allowed A’s appeal and set aside the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Federal Court also ordered that:

the decision of R2 dated 7 August 2020 approving R1’s application to partition the lands be cancelled;
the new titles issued by R2 and/or R3 in consequence of R2’s approval of R1’s application to partition the lands be cancelled; and
the original titles to the lands be reinstated and reissued.

Comments

The most significant aspect of this decision is the Federal Court has clarified that for the purposes of section 143(4) of the NLC (i.e. notification of the decision approving an application to partition land), the phrase “communicated to him” in section 418 of the NLC requires the communication to be in writing via official correspondence from the Land Administrator and not through informal means. The Federal Court also stressed that for the purposes of computation of time, the three-months’ period for filing an appeal under section 418 commences only when the relevant authority has provided sufficient information on the decision to enable an aggrieved party to know with some certainty as to the decision to enable him to determine whether or not to lodge an appeal under section 418.

The above aspect of the decision may be of wider import and could apply to other provisions of the NLC where a party who is aggrieved by a decision of the state director, the registrar or land administrator is conferred a right to appeal against the decision of the relevant authority.

The Federal Court also made two specific points with regard to an application to partition land under section 141A of the NLC. First, the requirement imposed on the land administrator under section 142(3) of the NLC to inform a co-proprietor of the proposed partition is a mandatory requirement and the failure to do so could invalidate the subsequent approval as the co-proprietor has been deprived of his statutory right to object to the proposed partitioning and to be heard on his objection.

Second, the Federal Court has taken the view that the applicant to partition land is under a duty to make full and frank disclosure of all relevant matters for consideration by the approving authority. Failure to do so could cause injustice to a co-proprietor as the relevant authority may have approved the application to partition land without the benefit of having all relevant information.

Case Note by Jesy Ooi (Partner) and Cynthia Lam (Associate) of the Real Estate Practice of Skrine.

¹ The judgment also referred to 1 July 2021 as an alternative commencement date for the three months but this issue was not considered in the Federal Court’s grounds of judgment.

² A summary of the Court of Appeal’s findings relating to the validity of the substituted service on A is summarised in paragraph [26] of the Federal Court’s judgment. This finding does not appear to have been argued in the Federal Court who accepted the Court of Appeal’s finding (see paragraph [35] of the Federal Court’s judgment).

This article/alert contains general information only. It does not constitute legal advice nor an expression of legal opinion and should not be relied upon as such. For further information, kindly contact skrine@skrine.com.

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Federal Court makes noteworthy rulings on partitioning of land under the National Land Code