First Move or Final Outcome: Does a Winding-Up Order Preserve an Overturned Adjudication Decision?

Introduction
 
Under Section 13 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA 2012"), an adjudication decision is binding until it is set aside, the subject matter is settled in writing, or the dispute is finally decided by arbitration or the court. This "temporary finality" allows a successful claimant to enforce the adjudication decision under Section 28 of CIPAA 2012 and, if it remains unpaid, to wind up the non-paying party, even while the underlying dispute is still being litigated or arbitrated. The rationale is to enable the claimant to address short-term cashflow needs while the primary dispute remains litigated.
 
This raises a question that had not previously been decided by the Malaysian courts: what happens to the adjudicated debt when the court later decides the underlying dispute the other way, especially after the same has been enforced through a winding-up order?
 
In YS Chong Enterprise Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi) v Perkasa Jauhari Sdn Bhd (dalam likuidasi) and another appeal [2026] MLJU 2959 ("YS Chong Case"), the Court of Appeal held that the winding-up order does not preserve the adjudicated debt. Once the dispute is finally decided by the court, the adjudication decision and its Section 28 enforcement order cease to have effect. Therefore, the adjudicated sum cannot be used as a set-off under Section 526 of the Companies Act 2016 ("CA 2016"). The Court of Appeal also decided, for the first time, when a dispute is "finally decided" for the purposes of Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012.
 
Background Facts
 
The Respondent, Perkasa Jauhari Sdn Bhd ("Perkasa"), engaged the Appellant, YS Chong Enterprise Sdn Bhd ("YS Chong"), as a sub-contractor for the MRT Lembah Kelang: Sungai Buloh-Kajang line project for a fixed contract sum of RM4.54 million. A payment dispute arose on the final account. By way of the Revised Final Claim, YS Chong claimed about RM2.5 million for additional structural steel work, while Perkasa in its Statement of Final Account, claimed that a sum of RM 2.8 million was due from YS Chong arising from debit notes and liquidated ascertained damages ("LAD") for delay.
 
In April 2018, Perkasa commenced proceedings in the High Court against YS Chong on the said dispute ("the Civil Suit"), and YS Chong counterclaimed.
 
Before the Civil Suit was determined, YS Chong commenced adjudication under CIPAA 2012. The subject matter of the adjudication and of the Civil Suit (in terms of the claim and set-off raised by both parties) were substantially the same. On 1 August 2018, the adjudicator allowed YS Chong's claim and dismissed Perkasa's LAD set-off ("Adjudication Decision"). YS Chong subsequently obtained an order to enforce the Adjudication Decision under Section 28 of CIPAA 2012 on 21 November 2018 ("Enforcement Order"), which Perkasa did not appeal.
 
Perkasa did not pay. YS Chong presented a winding-up petition based on the Enforcement Order, and Perkasa was wound up on 5 August 2019 ("Perkasa Winding-Up Order"). Perkasa appealed against the Perkasa Winding-Up Order but withdrew the appeal on 2 March 2021.
 
Notwithstanding the above, the Civil Suit proceeded to trial. On 21 July 2020, the High Court allowed Perkasa's claim and dismissed YS Chong's counterclaim ("Civil Suit Judgment"). YS Chong was unsuccessful in one appeal which did not meet the threshold for leave to appeal to the Federal Court. Another appeal was withdrawn.
 
Perkasa, acting through its liquidator, then served a statutory demand on YS Chong for RM3,600,325.18 under various judgments, including the Civil Suit Judgment, and related costs orders. YS Chong did not pay. Following a winding up petition filed by Perkasa on 21 November 2022 (“YS Chong Winding-Up Commencement Date”), YS Chong was wound up on 11 March 2025 ("YS Chong Winding-Up Order").
 
On appeal, YS Chong argued that the Adjudication Decision and Enforcement Order still represented a debt of RM2,599,443.65 owed by Perkasa, which should be set off under Section 526 of CA 2016 against the RM3,600,325.18, leaving a net balance of RM1,000,881.53 (which YS Chong had paid into Court as a condition for a stay of execution of the Winding-Up Order). YS Chong further argued that the Perkasa Winding-Up Order had confirmed the adjudicated debt, so that the debt could no longer be challenged by reason of res judicata or issue estoppel.
 
Decision of the Court of Appeal
 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and affirmed the YS Chong Winding-Up Order. This case note addresses three of the Court's findings, namely: 
  1. When a dispute is "finally decided by arbitration or the court" under Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012; 
  2. The effect of a final decision of the court on an adjudication decision that has been enforced under Section 28 of CIPAA 2012; and 
  3. Whether a winding-up order founded on an adjudication decision preserves the adjudicated debt by way of res judicata or issue estoppel. 
Issue 1 – A dispute is "finally decided" when the court of first instance or the arbitral tribunal delivers its decision on the merits
 
The Court identified two possible readings of the phrase "finally decided" in Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012: 
  1. That the dispute must be decided and no longer open to appeal; or 
  2. That the phrase describes the nature of the decision itself, namely a final decision on the merits as opposed to an interim or interlocutory one, so that Section 13(c) is engaged when the court of first instance or the arbitral tribunal delivers its decision, regardless of any appeal. 
Ong Chee Kwan JCA, delivering the judgment of the Court, preferred the second reading for three reasons: 
  1. As a matter of ordinary language, "finally decided" is read as an adjective describing the nature of the decision, which is a final decision on the merits as opposed to one which is interim, partial or interlocutory. 
  2. Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012 applies to both arbitration and court proceedings, so the phrase must bear the same consistent meaning for both modes. Pursuant to Section 36 of the Arbitration Act 2005 (“AA 2005”), an arbitral award is final and binding; this is subject only to the setting aside of the award under Section 37. If "finally decided" required all appeals to first be exhausted, an adjudication decision would cease to bind upon the issuance of an arbitral award, but would continue to bind for years if the dispute is litigated through the Court process (including the multi-tier appellate hierarchy). The Court found that Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012 was not intended to operate so differently depending on the forum. 
  3. The “temporary finality” objective of CIPAA 2012 exists to bridge the gap between the rapid adjudication regime and the final resolution which litigation or arbitration will provide. Once the court of first instance or the tribunal has decided the merits on full evidence, that purpose has been served. A pending appeal from a first-instance judgment does not revive the cashflow rationale for treating the adjudication decision as binding. Any protective measures, such as a stay, should be directed at the first-instance judgment, not at the adjudication decision. 
The Court noted that it was not referred to any Malaysian decision on the issue of when a dispute is “finally decided by arbitration or the court”. It therefore left open the question of what happens if a first-instance judgment that has triggered Section 13(c) is later reversed on appeal, as that did not arise on the facts of this case.
 
Applying this, the Adjudication Decision ceased to be binding on 21 July 2020 when the Civil Suit Judgment was delivered. It follows thereafter that the effect of the Enforcement Order, which conferred upon the Adjudication Decision the status of a judgement for execution under Section 28(3) of the CIPAA 2012, was correspondingly extinguished when the Adjudication Decision ceased to be binding.
 
Issue 2 – The Section 28 enforcement order falls away with the adjudication decision
 
The Court explained that an order under Section 28 of CIPAA 2012 only allows an adjudication decision to be enforced "as if it were a judgment" of the High Court. The Enforcement Order did not change the adjudication decision into an independent judgment debt. Its effect lasts only as long as the adjudication decision remains binding under Section 13 of CIPAA 2012. Once the Adjudication Decision ceased to be binding upon the Civil Suit Judgment, the effect of the Enforcement Order as a judgment was also extinguished.
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered the High Court decisions in ASM Development (KL) Sdn Bhd v Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 282 ("ASM Development") and Maju Holdings Sdn Bhd v Spring Energy Sdn Bhd [2020] MLJU 1196 ("Maju Holdings"). ASM Development held that an adjudication decision enforced under Section 28 of CIPAA 2012 (by the very nature of “temporary finality”) remains a disputable decision, unlike an arbitral award entered as a judgment under Section 38 of the AA 2005. Maju Holdings departed from that view, holding that the difference in wording between the two provisions is a distinction without a difference. In Maju Holdings, the court found that once a High Court makes an order under Section 28(2) of CIPAA 2012, that order is, in every sense of the matter for enforcement, a judgment or order of the High Court, no different from any other judgment or order the High Court makes in the exercise of its judicial power. A Section 28 order cannot be an undisputed debt for execution but disputed debt for winding-up purposes.
 
The Court in the YS Chong Case adopted the reasoning in Maju Holdings. For as long as it subsists, a judgment under Section 28 of CIPAA 2012 is a judgement of the High Court in its full sense for purposes of execution and of winding-up, in the same way as a judgment under Section 38 of the AA 2005. The only difference is that a judgment pursuant to Section 28 of CIPAA 2012 is extinguished upon a final decision of the underlying dispute pursuant to Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012, whereas a judgment enforcing an arbitration award is not affected by a later court decision on the same dispute.
 
The Court emphasised that this extinguishment operates prospectively from the date of the final decision. Acts done and orders made on the strength of the Enforcement Order before 21 July 2020, including the Perkasa Winding-Up Order, are not rendered void. They simply cannot be relied on by YS Chong as a continuing source of a debt to be set off.
 
Issue 3 – A winding-up order does not give rise to res judicata or issue estoppel on the adjudicated debt
 
YS Chong argued that the Perkasa Winding-Up Order made on 5 August 2019, constitutes a final and conclusive determination that the adjudicated debt was due and owing. Therefore, it was argued that the Civil Suit Judgment can no longer seek to extinguish the adjudicated debt which had been accepted by the winding-up court.
 
The Court rejected this argument. A winding-up court does not decide the merits of the underlying debt. It only decides whether the statutory requirements for winding-up are met, namely a valid demand, the requisite sum and the company's inability to pay, and whether there is a genuine and substantial dispute over the debt. The YS Chong Winding-Up Order determined only that Perkasa had failed to satisfy a demand founded on the Adjudication Decision and Enforcement Order as they then stood. The merits of the payment dispute were, at that time, still pending trial in the Civil Suit.
 
Perkasa's withdrawal of its appeal against the Perkasa Winding-Up Order on 2 March 2021 also did not assist YS Chong. By that date, the Adjudication Decision had already ceased to be binding under Section 13(c) when the Civil Suit Judgment was delivered on 21 July 2020, so there was no binding decision left to be preserved. The Court described the withdrawal as a non-event.
 
Similarly, as the adjudicated debt under the Adjudication Decision had been extinguished upon the Civil Suit Judgment being delivered on 21 July 2020, there was no debt owed by Perkasa to YS Chong under the Adjudication Decision or Enforcement Order on the YS Chong Winding-Up Commencement Date (i.e. 21 November 2022). With no mutual debt, the set off mechanism under Section 526 of CA 2016 did not apply, and the statutory demand correctly stated the full sum of RM3,600,325.18.
 
Principles from the Court of Appeal
 
The decision establishes the following principles: 
  1. A dispute is "finally decided" under Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012 when the court of first instance delivers its judgment, or the arbitral tribunal delivers its award, on the merits of the dispute referred to adjudication. It is not necessary to wait until all appeals are exhausted. 
  2. Court proceedings need not be brought to set aside the adjudication decision. It is enough that the same dispute is finally decided by the court or arbitration tribunal. 
  3. An order under Section 28 of CIPAA 2012 is, while it subsists, an undisputed judgment debt for the purposes of execution and winding-up. However, it is extinguished together with the adjudication decision upon a final decision under Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012. 
  4. The extinguishment is prospective. Steps taken and orders made on the strength of the enforcement order before the final decision, including any winding-up order, remain valid but cannot be relied upon after the final decision. 
  5. A winding-up order founded on an adjudication decision does not decide the merits of the underlying dispute, and does not give rise to res judicata or issue estoppel that preserves the adjudicated debt. 
  6. Once the adjudication decision has ceased to be binding, the adjudicated sum is not a debt that can be set off under Section 526 of CA 2016. 
Commentary
 
The decision in the YS Chong Case should be read together with the Court of Appeal's earlier decision in VKPT Sdn Bhd v LLC Infra Sdn Bhd 1 [2026] CLJU 2298, also delivered by Ong Chee Kwan JCA. VKPT held that registration under Section 28 of CIPAA 2012 makes an adjudicated debt indisputable for winding-up purposes, and that a final decision of the underlying dispute extinguishes the entire adjudication decision. The YS Chong Case confirms that this indisputability lasts only while the adjudication decision remains binding under Section 13. A winding-up order already made remains valid, but it does not keep the adjudicated debt alive.
 
The decision has the following practical consequences: 
  1. A party relying on an adjudication decision cannot treat a pending appeal against an adverse first-instance judgment as keeping the adjudication decision alive. From the date of that judgment, the adjudication decision is no longer binding. Any protection due to the pending appeal must be sought against the first-instance judgment itself, for example by way of a stay of execution. 
  2. A claimant that winds up the non-paying party on an adjudicated debt, while the underlying dispute is still pending, takes the risk that the court later decides the dispute against it. If that happens, the claimant cannot set off the adjudicated sum against the judgment sum, and may face the full judgment debt. It may also need the leave of the winding-up court to pursue its own claims against the company in liquidation, as YS Chong's struck-out appeal for its counterclaim shows. 
In closing, it should be reiterated that the Court of Appeal has expressly left open as to what happens where a first-instance judgment that has triggered Section 13(c) of CIPAA 2012 is reversed on appeal. Whether the adjudication decision revives in that situation remains to be decided.
 
 
Case Note by Nimalan Devaraja (Partner) and Tatvaruban Subramaniam (Partner) of the Dispute Resolution Practice of Skrine.
 
 
 

1  Our case note on VKPT Sdn Bhd v LLC Infra Sdn Bhd can be accessed here.

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