The Board of Peace – Overreaching Beyond Gaza?

On 10 October 2025, a much-welcomed ceasefire took effect that substantially ended the armed conflict between Israel and Hamas in the Gaza strip. The conflict had caused the loss of more than 100,000 lives1 and destruction of large swathes of Gaza since the outbreak of hostilities on 7 October 2023.
 
The Comprehensive Plan
 
The ceasefire brought into play the Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict (“Comprehensive Plan”) unveiled by President Donald Trump on 29 September 2025.2 The 20 points in the Comprehensive Plan include the following: 
  1. Deradicalise Gaza.
  2. Redevelop Gaza for the benefit of its people.
  3. Resume full humanitarian aid into Gaza, including rehabilitating infrastructure (water, electricity and sewage), hospitals and bakeries.
  4. Gaza will be governed under a temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee (comprising qualified Palestinians and international experts) which is responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. The committee is to be subject to oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the Board of Peace (“BOP”) headed and chaired by President Donald Trump. The BOP will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority (“PA”) has completed its reform program, as outlined in various proposals, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza.
  5. An economic development plan to rebuild Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped develop some of the thriving modern cities in the Middle East.
  6. A special economic zone will be established, with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries.
  7. Hamas and other factions will not have any role in the governance of Gaza. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarisation of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors.
  8. Regional partners will provide a guarantee to ensure that Hamas and the factions comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbours or its people.
  9. The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force (“ISF”) to be deployed in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza. The latter will serve as the long-term internal security solution.
  10. Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defence Forces (“IDF”) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarisation that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens.
  11. While the redevelopment of Gaza advances and when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which is recognised as the aspiration of the Palestinian people.
  12. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence. 
Resolution 2803 (2025)
 
The Comprehensive Plan was welcomed and adopted by the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) by Resolution 2803 (2025) at its 10046th meeting on 17 November 2025.
 
Key points in Resolution 2803 include the following: 
  1. Endorsing the Comprehensive Plan and calling on all parties to implement it in its entirety.
  2. Welcoming the establishment of the BOP as a transitional administration to set the framework, and coordinate funding for, the redevelopment of Gaza pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan until such time as the PA can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza.
  3. Authorising Member States participating in the BOP and the BOP to: (i) enter into such arrangements as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the Comprehensive Plan, including addressing the privileges and immunities of the ISF personnel; and (ii) establish operational entities with, as necessary, international legal personality and transactional authorities for the performance of the BOP’s functions, including: (a) the implementation of a transitional governance administration, including the supervision and support of a Palestinian technocratic, apolitical committee of competent Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, which shall be responsible for day-to-day operations of Gaza’s civil service and administration; (b) the reconstruction of Gaza and of economic recovery programs; and (c) the coordination, support and delivery of public services and humanitarian assistance in Gaza.
  4. Understanding that the operational entities referred to in item 3 above will operate under the transitional authority and oversight of the BOP and are to be funded through voluntary contributions from donors, the BOP funding vehicles and governments.
  5. Authorising Member States working with the BOP and the BOP to establish the ISF on a temporary basis under a unified command acceptable to the BOP, with forces contributed by participating States and to carry out its mandate consistent with international law, including international humanitarian law. The ISF shall work with Israel and Egypt, along with the newly trained and vetted Palestinian police force, to help secure border areas and stabilise the security environment in Gaza by ensuring the process of demilitarising the Gaza Strip. Further, as the ISF establishes control and stability, the IDF will withdraw from the Gaza Strip based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarisation that will be agreed between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terrorism threat. The ISF shall assist the BOP in monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire in Gaza and operate under the strategic guidance of the BOP and will be funded through voluntary contributions from donors, the BOP funding vehicles and governments.
  6. Deciding that the BOP and international civil and security presences authorised by Resolution 2803 shall remain authorised until 31 December 2027, subject to further action by the UNSC, and any further reauthorisation of the ISF shall be in full cooperation and coordination with Egypt and Israel and other Member States continuing to work with the ISF. 
The BOP Charter
 
In a signing ceremony held on 22 January 2026 on the side-lines of the 56th World Economic Forum in Davos, the United States and 19 States3 formally adopted the BOP Charter.
 
The salient provisions of the BOP Charter are summarised below.
 
Preamble
 
The Preamble, among others:
  1. Notes the need for courage to depart from approaches and institutions that have too often failed;
  2. Laments that too many approaches to peace-building foster perpetual dependency, and institutionalise crisis rather than leading people beyond it; and
  3. Emphasises the need for a more nimble and effective international peace-building body. 
Article 1: Mission
 
The BOP is an international organisation that seeks to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict.
 
Article 2.1: Membership
 
Membership in the BOP is limited to States invited by the Chairman.
 
Article 2.2(c): Member State Responsibilities
 
Each Member State shall serve a term of no more than three years from the BOP Charter’s entry into force, subject to renewal by the Chairman. However, the three-year membership term shall not apply to Member States that contribute more than USD1.0 billion in cash funds to the BOP within the first year of the Charter’s entry into force.
 
Article 2.3: Termination of Membership
 
Membership to the BOP shall terminate upon:
  1. Expiration of the three-year term, subject to Article 2.2(c) and renewal by the Chairman;
  2. Withdrawal with immediate effect in accordance with Article 4 by written notice to the Chairman;
  3. Removal by decision of the Chairman, subject to a veto by a 2/3rds majority of Member States; or
  4. Dissolution of the BOP. 
Article 3.1: The BOP
 
The BOP shall consist of its Member States.
 
The BOP shall convene voting meetings at least annually and at such additional times as the Chairman deems appropriate. The agenda at such meetings shall be set by the Executive Board, subject to notice and comment by Member States and approval by the Chairman.
 
Each Member State shall have one vote on the BOP.
 
Decisions shall be made by a majority of the Member States present and voting, subject to the approval of the Chairman, who may also cast a vote in his capacity as Chairman in the event of a tie.
 
The BOP shall also convene non-voting meetings on at least a quarterly basis.
 
Article 3.2: The Chairman
 
Donald Trump shall serve as the inaugural Chairman of the BOP, and shall separately serve as the inaugural representative of the United States.
 
Article 3.3: Succession and Replacement
 
The Chairman shall at all times designate a successor for the role of Chairman. Replacement of the Chairman may occur only following voluntary resignation or as a result of incapacity, as determined by a unanimous vote of the Executive Board, at which time the Chairman’s designated successor shall immediately assume the position of the Chairman and all of his associated duties and authorities.
 
Article 4.1: Executive Board Composition and Representation
 
The Executive Board shall be selected by the Chairman and consist of leaders of global stature. Members of the Executive Board shall serve two-year terms, subject to removal or renewal at the Chairman’s discretion.
 
The Executive Board shall be led by a Chief Executive nominated by the Chairman and confirmed by a majority vote of the Executive Board.
 
Decisions of the Executive Board shall be made by a majority of its members present and voting, including the Chief Executive. Such decisions shall take effect immediately, subject to veto by the Chairman at any time thereafter.
 
Article 4.1: Executive Board Mandate
 
The Executive Board shall exercise powers necessary and appropriate to implement the BOP’s mission, consistent with the BOP’s Charter, and shall report to the BOP on its activities and decisions on a quarterly basis and at additional times as the Chairman may determine.
 
Article 5.1: Expenses
 
The expenses of the BOP shall be through voluntary funding from Member States, other States, organizations, or other sources.
 
Article 7: Interpretation and Dispute Resolution
 
Internal disputes between and among Members of the BOP, entities, and personnel with respect to matters related to the BOP should be resolved through amicable collaboration, and for such purposes, the Chairman is the final authority regarding the meaning, interpretation, and application of the BOP Charter.
 
Article 8: Charter Amendments
 
Amendments to the BOP Charter may be proposed by the Executive Board or at least one-third of the Member States of the BOP acting together. Such amendments shall be adopted upon approval by a two-thirds majority of the BOP and confirmation by the Chairman. Amendments to Chapters II, III, IV, V, VIII, and X require unanimous approval of the BOP and confirmation by the Chairman.
 
Article 9: Resolutions and Other Directives
 
The Chairman, acting on behalf of the BOP, is authorised to adopt resolutions or other directives to implement the BOP’s mission.
 
Article 10.1: Duration
 
The BOP shall continue until it is dissolved in accordance with Article 10.2.
 
Article 10.2: Conditions for Dissolution
 
The BOP shall dissolve at such time as the Chairman considers necessary or appropriate, or at the end of every odd-numbered calendar year, unless renewed by the Chairman no later than November 21 of such odd-numbered calendar year.
 
Article 11.1(a): Entry into Force
 
The BOP Charter shall enter into force upon the expression of consent to be bound by three States.
 
Initial steps to implement the Comprehensive Plan
 
To implement the Comprehensive Plan, the membership of the Executive Board of the BOP (“BOP Executive Board”) and the Gaza Executive Board (“GEB”) were announced on 16 January 20264 following the announcement of the membership of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (“NCAG”) on 14 January 2026.
 
As envisioned in Article 4.1 of the BOP Charter, the mandate of the BOP Executive Board is to implement the mission of the BOP, that is to promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict.
 
The NCAG is the transitional body mandated by the United Nations to manage the day-to-day operations of the civil service and administration in the Gaza Strip and will play a central role in the reconstruction and restoration of Gaza under the oversight and supervision of the BOP. The role of the NCAG is envisaged in both the Comprehensive Plan and Resolution 28035, whilst the GEB is to help support effective governance and the delivery of best-in-class services that advance peace, stability, and prosperity for the people of Gaza.
 
In relation to security and peacekeeping matters, Major General Jasper Jeffers has been appointed Commander of the ISF and will lead security operations, support demilitarisation, and enable the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials. According to Major General Jeffers,  there are plans to supply 20,000 soldiers for the ISF. Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania have pledged to supply troops, while Egypt and Jordan have committed to train up to 12,000 vetted Palestinians for the police force.6
 
At the inaugural meeting of the BOP on 19 February 2026, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan and Kuwait have collectively pledged USD7.0 billion to a Gaza relief package, while the United States pledged a further USD10.0 billion to the BOP7. The total amount pledged is almost 25% of the estimated sum of USD70.0 billion required for the reconstruction of Gaza.
 
Observations
 
Based on its Charter, it is clear that the BOP is not established as a single purpose entity for the reconstruction of Gaza, but rather, aspires to be an international peace-building body in areas affected or threatened by conflict. In fact, no reference is made to Gaza in the Charter.
 
The preamble to the Charter also expresses a need for the BOP to be a nimble and effective entity and to depart from approaches and institutions that have failed in the past.
 
From the provisions of the Charter, it is evident that Donald Trump, as an individual, is the lynchpin of the BOP, and not the government of the United States or the person holding office as the President of that country. The Charter provides that Trump will continue to serve as the Chairman of the BOP even after completing his four-year term as President of the United States. Powers conferred by the Charter on the Chairman include, among others, the power to invite States to join the BOP and, subject to the veto by a 2/3rds majority of Member States, to terminate the membership of any Member State. It also empowers the Chairman, acting on behalf of the BOP, to adopt resolutions and directives to implement the BOP’s mission.
 
The BOP has been criticised as an ego-trip by Trump.8 Further, its Charter has raised concerns that the BOP’s role overlaps with that of the United Nations as an international peace-building organisation. When one considers the mission of the BOP as set out in the Charter, it can be argued that the BOP has overreached the objectives set out in the Comprehensive Plan adopted by the UNSC. On the other hand, it can also be argued that the question of overreaching does not arise as there is no legal prohibition against any country or individual from establishing an organisation for peace-building purposes, and whether such organisation would receive sufficient support from States or other international bodies to succeed is a practical rather than a legal consideration.
 
While the above concerns cannot be dismissed outright, it must be acknowledged that the steps taken by the BOP thus far in relation to the reconstruction of Gaza have largely been in line with the steps set out in the Comprehensive Plan. Assuming the donors fulfil their financial pledges and the amounts are applied for the reconstruction of Gaza, it is commendable that the BOP has within a relatively short time, raised almost 25% of the estimated sum required for this purpose.
 
For now, perhaps the critics of Trump and the BOP should give them the benefit of the doubt, and in the words of the late John Lennon, “Give Peace A Chance”?
 
 
Article by Kok Chee Kheong (Consultant) of Skrine.
 
 
 

1 Gaza: study reveals unprecedented losses of life and life expectancy; Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (MPIDR) and the Centre for Demographic Studies (CED); 25 November 2025.
2 Trump's 20-point Gaza peace plan in full; bbc.com; 9 October 2025.
3 The 19 States are Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Mongolia, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan. El Salvador and Israel agreed to join the BOP but did not attend the signing of the Charter (Source: Wikipedia, visited on 27 February 2026).
5 See item 4 of the summary of the Comprehensive Plan and item 3 of the summary of Resolution 2803 above.
8 Trump's Board of Peace: An ego trip; Star Online; 23 February 2026.

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